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Abstract Modern health care relies extensively on the use of technologies for
assessing and treating patients, so it is important to be certain that health care technol-
ogies (i.e., pharmaceuticals, devices, procedures, and organizational systems) perform
their professed functions in an effective and safe manner. Philosophers of technology
have developed methods to assign and evaluate the functions of technological products,
the major elements of which are described in the ICE theory. This paper questions
whether the standard of evidence advocated by the ICE theory is adequate for ascribing
and assessing technologies employed in health care. The paper proposes that the
general problem with the standard of evidence embodied in the ICE theory (i.e.,
testimony and evidence of mechanisms) is too permissive for assessing medical
technologies, in that it does not take into account the relative benefit and harm of
medical technologies in ensuring safe functional performance in patients. The paper
illustrates how evidence-based medicine (EBM) has demonstrated the value of clinical
research methods, including observational studies, randomized and non-randomized
clinical trials, and formal techniques, such as meta-analysis, to measure therapeutic
effectiveness. I argue, therefore, that evidence from clinical research studies should take
precedence over the testimonial evidence and other types of non-clinical evidence, in
providing justification for health technologies.
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1 Introduction
Health technologies play a crucial role in medicine, and modern health care
relies extensively on the use of technologies for assessing and treating patients.
As in most practical endeavors, the action-oriented nature of medical technolo-
gies entails their frequent use for attaining health-related goals and outcomes in
treating patients and managing disease. For this reason, it is of interest to
patients, clinicians, and policy makers that these technologies can be relied
upon to perform their professed functions in an effective and safe manner.
Although the impact of technological use on health care practice cannot be
overstated, it often remains unclear whether medical functions have been
assigned properly, and what is required to distinguish useful from useless, or
even harmful, technologies.
Philosophers of technology have devoted substantial effort to analyze what it
means to assign functions to technological products. One important account of
functional ascriptions is the ICE theory of functions (Houkes et al. 2010, 2011;
Vermaas and Houkes 2006). The ICE analysis attempts to characterize techno-
logical artifacts as intentionally designed products with functions that are utilized
by agents for attaining goals by following a set of actions. This set of actions is
specified by a use plan, which relates information about the proper use and
function of these technologies. For the use plan to be valid, it must be justified
on the basis of some relevant evidence. Relevant evidential support that the ICE
theory identifies for this purpose includes knowledge about physiochemical
capacities (i.e., biotechnological mechanisms), individual experience, expertise,
and testimony. Although ICE theorists commonly enumerate several possible
sources of evidence, testimonial evidence and physiochemical reasoning about
biotechnological processes or mechanisms have received specific epistemological
attention for attaining functional knowledge. For example, the ICE theorists are
often explicit about taking Btestimony seriously as a source of evidence^
(Houkes 2006, p. 107). As suggested by Vermaas and Houkes (2006),
BTestimony is not just a basis for the effectiveness, capacity and contribution
beliefs that are involved in function ascriptions, but also provides a basis for this
privileging^ (p. 114).
Note that ICE theorist is not committed to merely describing how action-oriented
technologies (e.g., health care products) are commissioned and used in different
contexts. Rather, proponents of the ICE theory of evidence seek to provide a
normative framework for evaluating and justifying technological use. As Houkes and
Vermaas (2010) put it, Bwe approach both artefacts and the actions in which they play a
role largely from a normative rather than a descriptive perspective. We do not offer a
theory about how people actually use or design artefacts, or how they in fact describe
them in functional terms; instead we seek to provide a framework for evaluating some
aspects of these activities, and we theorise about rational and proper artefact use, and
about justifiable function ascriptions^ (p. 4).
This paper contends, however, that the evidential framework that the ICE
theorists endorse proves inadequate for assigning functions to technologies
intended for medical purposes. It is argued that ICE functions are not justified
as an appropriate evidential standard that should be required for justifiably
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assigning functions to health care technologies. 1 I suggest that ICE theory’s
endorsement of testimony as serious source for justification entails an inadequate
theory of evidence for basing functional ascriptions to medical technologies. 2
This paper also argues that the evidential role ascribed to mechanisms (i.e.,
information about physiochemical capacities from basic biomedical research)
has been exaggerated, emphasizing more balanced appraisals of the usefulness
of mechanisms with respect to their epistemic value in the medical sciences and
biotechnological innovation. Promising as its application may appear for biotech-
nological fields such as clinical pharmacology and drug development, the evi-
dential value of mechanisms has not been empirically shown to be successful in
these areas (Mebius et al. 2016). Translating evidence from laboratory research
on mechanisms and/or relying on clinical testimony risks drawing a biased and
incomplete picture of the functional merits of medical technologies that can lead
to the adoption of ineffective or even harmful treatments.
Section 2 presents the Vermaas and Houkes ICE theory for analyzing technological
artifacts and discusses its relevance for assigning functions to medical technologies.
Section 3 argues that the ICE account provides a theory of evidence that is unacceptable
for the assessment of health technologies. In section 4, I show that faulty or inappro-
priate evidence risks misleading functional ascriptions and argue that few, if any, of the
sources of evidence enumerated by the theory meets the desired evidential standard for
reliably assigning functions to technologies for clinical purposes. Section 5 proposes
that ascribing functions to technologies in health care can only be justified by evidence
of high quality from comparative clinical studies. Section 6 clarifies what high-quality
evidence entails, and what it means for a health care technology to Bfunction^ in a
clinically relevant sense. This is done by placing the further constraint that the type of
justification needed for ascribing medical functions to artifacts should require evidence
that technologies are clinically effective meaning that their use entails (1) patient-
relevant benefits that outweigh any harm, (2) that they are clinically applicable to their
intended target population of patients, and (3) they are the best available option for the
clinical purpose.
2 The ICE Theory of Functions
A general way to think about medical technologies is that they are material objects
developed for use in some form of human activity. The roles played by technologies in
these activities are in some theoretical accounts considered to be more or less the
product of intentional and social elements, as opposed to being determined by the
physiochemical capacities inherent in the technologies themselves (Bijker 1987).
Meanwhile, other theorists of technological functions maintain that institutional and
1 Although my aim here is to consider functions ascribed to health technologies, the discussion might also be
relevant to the analysis of technological use in non-clinical contexts, for example, in assessing technological
use related to social policy interventions (c.f. La Caze and Colyvan 2016).
2 I follow the Health Technology Assessment Programme (HTA) in defining Bhealth technology^ or Bmedical
technology^ as: BAn intervention that may be used to promote health, to prevent, diagnose or treat acute or
chronic disease, or for rehabilitation. Health technologies include pharmaceuticals, devices, procedures and
organizational systems used in health care^ [http://htaglossary.net/tiki-index.php?page=health].
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social backgrounds are interconnected with physical structures in determining the
functional status of technological artifacts (Kroes 2002; Houkes et al. 2011).
Vermeer and Houkes’ ICE theory is one of the most prominent accounts of
technological functions and an example of the interconnected approach. The ICE
theory of functions, first introduced by Vermaas and Houkes (2003) and Vermaas
and Houkes (2004; Houkes and Vermaas 2010), provides an analysis of functional
ascriptions to technologies that reads as follows:
BAn agent a ascribes the capacity to ϕ as a function to an artefact x, relative to a
use plan p for x and relative to an account A, if:
I. the agent a has the capacity belief that x has the capacity to ϕ, when manipulated
in the execution of p, and the agent a has the contribution belief that if this
execution of p leads successfully to its goals, this success is due, in part, to x’s
capacity to ϕ;
C. the agent can justify these two beliefs on the basis of A; and
E. the agents d who developed p have intentionally selected x for the capacity to ϕ
and have intentionally communicated p to other agents u.^ (Vermaas &and Houkes
2006, p. 9)
The I condition maintains that the agent ascribing the function should believe that
the functional capacity materializes when the technology is implemented in accordance
to the use plan. Condition C requires that the agent ascribing the function must be able
to justify his or her belief that the artifact will perform its intended function according to
a pre-specified use plan. Importantly, condition C requires more than that the agent who
makes an ascription believes that the artifact has a functional capacity (as required by
condition I). What it requires in addition is that the agent cites a relevant source of
evidence that justifies his or hers belief that the artifact is functionally effective. For this
purpose, the ICE theory of evidence considers the following evidential sources:
BThe relevant evidencemay be experience that the artefact has the capacity, testimony
by other agents, or scientific or technological knowledge; in all cases, the evidence
supports the function ascription by supporting the beliefs that the artefact has the
corresponding physicochemical capacity and that this capacity explains, in part, the
effectiveness of a use plan.^ (Houkes and Vermaas 2010, p. 102)
Although numerous sources of possible evidential justifications are cited by the
authors in this passage and elsewhere, including knowledge of physiochemical capac-
ities, experience of effective performance, and testimonies from other users or de-
signers, evidential support can generally be provided by Bany agent who develops and
communicates a use plan and who can justify it, if only by plain experience that it
works^ (Vermaas and Houkes 2006, p. 9).
ICE theorists plausibly assume that an ascription of function needs and contains a
justification. A manufacturer of a drug or diagnostic agent is normally required to
justify the claimed performance of its product by citing relevant evidence for its
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functional effectiveness. This allows claims about the efficacy and safety of technolo-
gies to be challenged on evidential grounds. However, it is a mistake to suppose, or so I
shall argue, that testimonial evidence along with other ICE evidential types provides an
adequate evidential standard for justifying that medical technologies are able to func-
tion properly.
A general problem with the ICE condition C is that it is too permissive in the sort of
evidence that it allows to be cited in support of I. This is also noted by Hansson (2006),
who similarly observes that such a general theory of evidence entails the unwanted
consequence that Bthe condition C will almost always be satisfied when the I condition
is satisfied^ (p. 20). One might suggest resolving the problem by modifying condition
C as to exclude weaker forms of evidence, such as testimony, as justifiers of functional
ascriptions. However, this proposal seems to be at odds with the subject-dependent
notion of function on which ICE justifications are based: BIn the case of technical
functions, we have both the subject-independent notion x has the function ϕ’ and
subject-dependent notions such as a believes that x has the function to ϕ’. Vermaas and
Houkes have chosen to define a subject-dependent notion, namely that of a single
individual’s ascriptions of a function to an object.^ (Hansson 2006, p. 20). Moreover,
excluding subject-dependent forms of evidence, such as testimony, would be inconsol-
able with a theory of evidence that maintains testimonial evidence is indispensable:
BTestimony is not just a basis for the effectiveness, capacity and contribution beliefs
that are involved in function ascriptions, but also provides a basis for this privileging^
(Vermaas and Houkes 2006, p. 114).
In any case, the ICE theory arguably employs too broad a concept of evidence for
assigning and evaluating medical functions. The most significant issue with this notion
of evidence is its reliance on testimony and preclinical information about biotechno-
logical mechanisms, which puts it at odds with the evidential standards found in clinical
research and practice. In the following section, I discuss why the ICE theory of
evidence proves inadequate for circumscribing functions in the case of health care
technology. I also show why the type of evidence enumerated by its proponents, such
as testimony and/or theories and models of physicochemical capacities (biotechnolog-
ical mechanisms), is inappropriate for reliably describing health technologies effective-
ness and safety.
In the following section, it is argued that the ICE epistemology of functional
ascription proves inadequate for assigning clinically relevant functions to medical
technologies because of the very high risk of bias generally inherent in expert testimony
and evidence of mechanisms. I show that expert testimony is problematic because some
experts may claim that a technological intervention is effective while other experts may
disagree. The key question then is how to determine the relative value of a biotechno-
logical intervention given contradictory claims about the safety and effectiveness of
that intervention.
3 Testimony and Biotechnological Mechanisms as Evidence
Philosophers of technology have insisted that expert testimony and evidence of bio-
technological mechanisms can be used to support the assigning of functions to medical
technologies. Yet, evidence of mechanisms does not feature in dominant EBM
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standards of evidence. This section examines evidential standards in medicine and
suggests why evidence, such as testimony and mechanistic reasoning, has ceased to
play a significant role in supporting functional ascriptions to health technologies.
Testimony is a form of evidence based on personal experience that is often invoked
in establishing consensus among experts. Evidence-based medicine rose to prominence
after a long predominance of consensus conferences for assessment of medical tech-
nologies. A couple of years before evidence-based medicine (EBM) methodology was
adopted throughout health care for guiding health research and patient care, Mario
Bunge stated, in his book on the philosophy of technology, BMedicine…is now on the
right track, though it has a long way to go before attaining the rigor and effectiveness of
engineering^ (1985, p. 246). At that time, the evaluation of medical technologies was
still being dominated by pre-EBM conceptions of clinically reliable evidence, such as
Bexpert consensus.^ As late as 1990, governmental agencies and health care regulators
responsible for assessing the use of technologies relied on testimony and personal
experience as indispensable sources of evidence:
BGroup judgment is perhaps the most widely used means of assessment of medical
technologies in many countries. The consensus development conference is a relatively
inexpensive and rapid mechanism for the consideration and evaluation of different
attributes of a medical technology including, for example, safety, efficacy, and effi-
ciency, among many others.^ (Baratz and Goodman 1990)
Only a few years later, after the introduction of the EBM in medicine, expert
consensus was viewed by the same regulatory agencies and health experts as the lowest
level of evidence. For example, the Canadian Task force on Preventive Health Care
stated that BEvidence takes precedence over consensus^ (Canadian Task Force on
Preventive Health Care). From its introduction just over two decades ago, EBM has
come to dominate medical practice, teaching, and policy. EBM initially defined itself as
a method that.
Bde-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiolog-
ical rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the
examination of evidence from clinical research.^ (Evidence-Based Medicine
Working Group 1992)
Although the original definition has been somewhat refined (partially as the result of
legitimate critique of its methodology3), EBM research has continued to dominate the
field of health care. EBM rules of evidence are, for instance, employed by policy
makers in directing clinical guidelines (Howick et al. 2015), and EBM research
methods are endorsed by the editorial policies of leading medical journals, such as
the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) and the British Medical
Journal (BMJ). Some of the most crucial aspects of the EBM theory of evidence lies in
3 The subsequent definition emphasizes the role of values: BEvidence-based practice is the integration of
clinical expertise, patient values, and the best research evidence into the decision making process for patient
care. Clinical expertise refers to the clinician’s cumulated experience, education and clinical skills. The patient
brings to the encounter his or her own personal preferences and unique concerns, expectations, and values.
The best research evidence is usually found in clinically relevant research that has been conducted using sound
methodology^ (Sackett 1996, p. 71)^. Other criticisms of EBM have pointed out a range of issues, such as an
overemphasis on randomization and clinical trials (Worrall 2002).
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its emphasis on the use of systematic reviews and the superiority of comparative
clinical studies (including observational studies and randomized trials) over pathophys-
iologic rationale (descriptions of biological and biotechnological mechanisms) and
expert judgment. EBM provides a set of formal methods and techniques for evaluating
the effectiveness of medical technologies. The techniques implemented by EBM are
especially useful for evaluating treatments that present incremental advantages to
current treatment standards. EBM methods have been extended in recent years to areas
such as public health interventions, which offer promising ways of testing, for example,
technologies outside clinical settings (e.g., food policy programs) (but c.f. Cartwright
and Hardie 2012).
Ascribing the use of health technologies on the basis of weak evidence
supporting claims to functional effectiveness and safety arguably puts patients
at risk because questions about their harm and benefit are inadequately ad-
dressed. One glaring example from the history of medicine is the use of the
lancet. This instrument was used primarily for bloodletting patients suffering
from various conditions. Until the mid-19th century, most physicians believed
that the lancet afforded a far superior method for treating various diseases.
Most physicians accordingly ascribed this function to the lancet. The Edinburg
physician William Buchan, for example, claimed in his influential 1769 medical
guide Domestic Medicine that:
BNo operation of surgery is so frequently necessary as bleeding…Bleedings for
topical inflammations ought always to be performed as near the part affected as
possible. When this can be done with a lancet, it is to be preferred to any other
method; but where a vein cannot be found, recourse must be had to leeches or
cupping. The quantity of blood must be always be regulated by strength, age,
constitution, manner of life, and other circumstances relating to the patient. It
would be ridiculous to suppose that a child could bear to lose as much blood as a
grown person, or that a delicate lady should be bled to the same extent as a robust
man.^ (Buchan et al. 2012, p. 30)
In a somewhat similar vein, the essentiality of bloodletting was expressed by
Thomas Smith in his Extracts from the Diary of a Huntsman from 1838: B…the best
thing [a huntsman] can do, if [his] horse is distressed, is to have about two or three
quarts of blood taken from him, see that he has some gruel and is properly taken care
of…^ (Smith 1921, p. 65).
During its popularity, many explanations were put forward by some of the most
eminent physicians to explain the alleged effectiveness of therapies such as
bloodletting, vomiting, blistering, and purging by referencing contemporary au-
thorities and Galenic theories along Bhumoral^ lines that mostly proved to be
harmful to the patient (Tröhler 2012). Similarly, many biotechnological innova-
tions will have promising medical functions that often find support in animal
models that are well-studied, corroborated theories, and various laboratory find-
ings. It is often the case, however, that one finds technologies with well-supported
preclinical evidence to be non-functional or insufficiently effective when it comes
to producing the expected benefit in clinical settings (Pound and Bliss 2014). This
is why researchers continuously point out that expert testimony, similar to
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laboratory research, provides very limited justification when it comes to reliably
establishing the efficacy and safety of medical procedures. This issue is often
commented upon by medical researchers, as seen here by Dave Sackett, one of the
founders of the EBM movement:
BMillions of dollars’ worth of bench research that appeared to show that a
reduction in atherosclerosis-related oxidative stress with vitamin E therapy was
recently tested in an RCT[Randomized Controlled Trial] that asked the vital
question: Does vitamin E therapy endorsed by this research really help prevent
heart disease? The answer was a resounding ‘No’.^ (Sackett et al. 1999, p. 1414)
To take another example, consider the functional justification of vertebroplasty.
Vertebroplasty is a medical technique developed for alleviating pain associated
with bone fracture. This technique consists of injecting polymethylmethacrylate
cement into the fractured bone and was introduced during the mid-1990s. Nu-
merous researchers began reporting remarkable effects of this procedure (Jensen
et al. 1997), and vertebroplasty was reimbursed by Medicare in 2001, even
though no proper comparative clinical studies were performed to establish that
the procedure was functionally safe and effective (Prasad and Ho 2014). In 2004,
24,000 vertebroplasties were reported to have been performed in the United
States alone. During this period of widespread implementation, several mecha-
nistic explanations were put forward that supposedly explained the physiochem-
ical properties underlying vertebroplasty’s effective use: Bthe stabilization of the
fractured vertebrae; reduction of mechanical stress; and destruction of the nerve
endings because of the cement’s mechanical, chemical, cytotoxic, and thermal
activity as well as its anti-inflammatory action^ (Chen et al. 2004, p. 229).
In 2009, however, results from two independent comparative clinical trials
were published in the New England Journal of Medicine which showed that the
procedure was no more effective than sham procedures (Buchbinder et al. 2009;
Kallmes et al. 2009). This example of vertebroplasty and Sackett’s example of
the ineffectiveness of vitamin E therapy illustrate the potentially harmful or
wasteful practice of assigning functions to technologies by translating pre-
clinical effectiveness beliefs, or mechanistic theories about purported functions,
that consequently fail to materialize. In evaluating technologies for treatment
purposes, there are usually many uncertainties and concerns about effectiveness,
and if, in fact, an intervention leads to more harm than good. One clear
epistemic virtue of, for example, the methodology inherent in a properly con-
ducted randomized trial is that it decreased the level of uncertainty by reducing
the likelihood of bias and the role of chance interfering with the results (Evans
et al. 2010).
I do not contend that some types of technological knowledge relate to conventions
that are generally agreed upon for different purposes. For example, knowing that the
insulation of the ground wire should be striped in yellow and green (according to
standard convention) is a highly useful piece of technological knowledge for an
electrician. It might be said that Bthe experienced doctor can often make a correct
diagnosis within his area of expertise without doing a full examination…,^ and that
knowledge of this type Bcan only be learned through experience^ (Nordström 2011, p.
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8). However, the fact that doctors make the correct diagnosis based on their expertise is
often not enough.
To take an example, research reports of diagnostic studies suggest that the clinical
accuracy of malignant melanoma ranges from 64 to 80 % (Marghoob et al. 2009). This
means that up to one third of all patients presenting with melanomas are likely to be
misdiagnosed even after a full examination. Although it might be possible that an
experienced doctor will be able to achieve a high degree of accuracy, few would contend
that their diagnostic ability (expert judgment) is sufficiently adequate for detecting
melanoma, given that even the most seasoned dermatologist (≥10-year experience)
can, at his best, only achieve an 80 % success rate (Morton and Mackie 1998). This,
in fact, explains why the misdiagnosis of this type of cancer is among the most
commonly cited causes for malpractice litigation initiated against clinicians. Of course,
achieving a 100% success rate is not a feasible goal inmany cases.My only point here is
that clinical experience, like many forms of expertise, is often too fallible a source of
evidence.
I hope that this section has explained why functional ascriptions based on
weaker forms of evidence, such as testimony, expert judgment, and physio-
chemical (mechanistic) reasoning (or combinations of these), provide inadequate
evidential support. The next section argues that well-performed comparative
clinical studies are indispensable in guiding functional ascriptions of medical
technologies. These types of studies have, for example, the distinctive advan-
tage of being able to capture small to moderate improvements in health-related
outcomes following the use of a technology. That is, clinical studies are able to
measure and compare continuous variables, and this can establish the degree of
functionality of a technology.
4 Evidence-Based Clinical Studies
In this section, we consider how evidence from comparative clinical research can
inform and constrain the ascription of functions to medical technologies. I argue that
evidence from clinical studies takes precedence over other types of evidence
concerning the functionality of health technologies because clinical studies provide
strong justification for medical interventions by, for example, providing a specific
estimate of functional efficiency and effectiveness. That is, they often provide a
continuous estimate, rather than a categorical estimate, of therapeutic effectiveness,
and they have the ability to compare such estimates to find out which one is more
beneficial.4 As such, measures obtained from comparative clinical studies often permit
the quantification of the strength of effectiveness associated with a particular dose in a
particular setting in a particular population.
The methodological importance of comparative clinical studies can partly be in-
ferred from their widely adopted use for evaluating technological functions (Guyatt
et al. 2008; Higgins and Green 2011; Straus et al. 2011). Clinical research methods
often applied for such purposes include observational studies (e.g., retrospective and
4 I use the term Bclinical studies^ to mean experimental (randomized or non-randomized) clinical trials and
observational (or non-experimental) studies.
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prospective cohort studies), randomized or non-randomized clinical trials, and different
formal techniques, such as the meta-analysis of data to synthesize evidence obtained
from clinical studies. The evidence generated by these methods is considered to be
more reliable than, for example, laboratory research and expert testimony, because
evidence from clinical studies is less likely to suffer from systematic bias (OCEBM
Levels of Evidence Working Group 2011, Schünemann et al. 2008).
Comparative clinical trials, for example, have the advantage of being able to
employ measures to protect against confounding factors, such as random allocation
of subjects, concealment of treatment conditions, and double blinding (Howick &
Mebius 2014; Mebius 2015), which methodological research can significantly
reduce the risk of systematic bias (Schulz et al. 1995; Howick 2016). Additional
methodological criteria for assessing the quality of synthesized data from clinical
studies are usually put in place to further minimize the risk of bias (see, for
example, Shea et al. 2007). In short, from the perspective of clinical research and
practice to assess the validity of technological functions, clinical studies are better
equipped to protect the assessment of functionality from possible confounding
variables that might distort the evaluation process.
Comparative clinical studies also have the advantage that they can estimate
the effectiveness of a technological intervention relative to a comparable tech-
nological intervention in humans. Comparative clinical studies, such as random-
ized controlled trials, are thus able to estimate the degree of efficacy that a
technological intervention is able to provide. Such information becomes advan-
tageous when, for example, assessing how much an intervention is able to
reduce pain and improve function in patients with osteoarthritis of the knee
(Fransen and McConnell 2008). This further allows a comparison to be made
between health technologies targeting similar treatment pathways. For example,
a study might show that less invasive techniques (such as ultrasonography) may
be equal to or diagnostically better than more invasive techniques, such as
angiography (Knottnerus et al. 2009).
No corresponding method seems to exist in reasoning about physiochemical struc-
tures (mechanisms), or arriving at a decision by consensus, which allows the same
systematic and precise estimates of the comparative efficacy (or inefficacy) of medical
technologies, which can detect seemingly small (yet clinical significant) differences in
functionality. Another advantage of comparative studies is that they are informed by
data gathered from implementing technologies in actual clinical settings (unlike exper-
iments on animals under laboratory conditions). That is why most guidelines and
national medical agencies require beliefs about functional efficiency and safety to be
grounded in evidence from clinical studies, such as observational studies, randomized
controlled trials, or systematic reviews and meta-analyses of high-quality evidence
obtained by these research methods.
Proponents of the ICE theory and/or mechanistic research might object by
maintaining that medical functions are different from other types of technological
functions. However, because much technological development directly and indi-
rectly involves developing tools for managing, restoring, or repairing some aspect
of human health, a large proportion of technology proper would then have to be
abandoned by the ICE theory of technological functions. This would exclude the
ascription of functions to synthesized drugs (e.g., aspirin), biotechnologies (e.g.,
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viral antigen tests), and technology proper (e.g., MRI, functional MRI, CT, PET,
and many others). For example, the Health Technology Assessment Programme
(HTA) (which is part of the British National Institute of Health Research) provides
the following description:
B‘Technologies’ in this context mean any method used to promote health; prevent
and treat disease; and improve rehabilitation or long-term care. They are not
confined to new drugs and include any intervention used in the treatment,
prevention or diagnosis of disease.^ (HTA 2014)
As previously noted, the aim of regulatory bodies and governmental agencies, such as
HTA, is to promote evidence-based research methods for establishing the comparative
effectiveness and safety of medical technologies. In the case of HTA, evidence of investi-
gated technologies (new or preexisting) is meant to provide justification for their use within
the National Health Service (NHS). Correspondingly, the National Institute of Health and
Clinical Excellence (NICE) bases its policies and guidelines on the results of EBM research.
Moreover, because evaluations of policy interventions are increasingly utilizing the eviden-
tial standards originally developed by the EBMmovement, it is likely that the proponents of
ICE functions will need to abandon it as a theory of evidence for many social policy
implementation of technologies, as well (see, e.g., Vodopivec-Jamsek et al. 2012).
Although the requirements for functional ascriptions, today, have been substantially
improved, a great deal of functional ascriptions is still based on weak types of evidence.
The next section discusses the conditions under which a medical technology should be
considered to have a clinically effective function. These considerations are then applied
in the formulation of evidential criteria required for assigning functions to technological
artifacts intended for health care purposes.
5 Clinically Effective Technological Products
The section suggests the type of restrictions on evidential warrants required to ade-
quately determine clinical impact in terms of effectiveness, relevance, and safety. It
should be apparent that better evidence allows researchers, health care providers, and
policy makers to evaluate the effectiveness of different health interventions better, and
that more efficient evidential standards allow for more ethical and resourceful health
care decisions about medical technologies.
To begin, it should be noted that it is not necessary to understand the details
regarding the causal interactions between biological and technological mechanisms.
Often the function, safety, and efficacy of a device, drug, or diagnostic tool will be well
documented even though knowledge about the physiochemical properties of the
biological and technological mechanisms will be severely lacking or otherwise incom-
plete. There are many examples where the findings from comparative clinical studies
would overturn earlier medical technologies that were adopted on the basis of weak
evidence. It has been argued that many of these ascriptions of functional effectiveness
overlooked available evidence from comparative clinical studies that indicated these
interventions were ineffective (i.e., they did not serve their ostensible function) and/or
harmful (Prasad et al. 2014).
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For example, mechanistic evidence suggesting that monoclonal antibodies
perform well in critically ill infected patients have been found to be ineffective
by clinical research (McCloskey et al. 1994). Another well-known example is the
Cardiac Arrhythmia Suppression Trial (CAST) which overturned the advice from
expert testimony that treating patients with encainide and flecainide after a
myocardial infarction would reduce mortality, when instead, it significantly in-
creased mortality (and according to some estimates resulted in more premature
deaths in the USA than the number of US soldiers killed in action during the
Vietnam War) (Moore 1995). Finally, the deleterious advice given by Dr. Spock in
his bestselling book Baby and Child to place babies on their stomach to sleep led
to tens of thousands of avoidable crib deaths (Gilbert et al. 2005). Hence, clinical
research not only has a better grasp of function than structure, but it can also
correct misplaced assumptions about physiochemical capacities of mechanisms.
As suggested earlier, the EBMmethodology maintains that evidence about treatment
effects of medical technologies is most reliably obtained from tightly controlled clinical
studies. This view is partially based on the notion that the methods used in these studies
can be characterized as directly action guiding. For example, Hansson (2014) suggests
that clinical trials, one of the key study designs in EBM, represent the Bgold standard^
of justification in medicine because they can provide evidence that directly guides
action: BClinical trials are directly action-guiding experiments on treatment effects^
(2014, p. 41). In his historical survey, Hansson compares the utility of the modern
clinical experimental tradition, with its utility to directly guide action, to (technological)
experiments conducted by craftspeople in pre-scientific times, concluding that evidence
from high-quality clinical trials provides a Bgold-standard^ of evidence compared with
non-clinical studies (see also Hansson 2015).
Having considered the evidence that clinical studies provide the most appropriate
type of justification for assigning functions to medical technologies, we now turn to the
question of how to distinguish between relevant and high-quality evidence of this type.
The decision to implement technologies in health care practice necessarily requires
evidence that these technologies are clinically effective. The idea of what is meant by
clinically effective is nicely conveyed by Howick (2011): Bclinically effective…means
that the treatment has (1) patient-relevant benefits that outweigh any harms, (2) is
applicable to the patient being treated, and (3) is the best available option^ (p. 24).
Arguably, it seems clear that technologies that do more harm than good should not be
described as having a function in the Beffective^ sense of the word. As Ashcroft
remarks in a paper titled BWhat is clinical effectiveness?^: BFrom a prescriber’s point
of view, and from a consumer’s, it would be a misuse of language to say that a drug
whose side-effects are such that they outweigh its benefits is effective^ (2002, p 226).5
Although establishing the effectiveness of a technology is a necessary condition for
its implementation in clinical practice, it is not a sufficient condition. To assess the
effectiveness of a health care technology, we first need to specify the treatment context
in which its medical function might be relevant. In addition to being adequately
5 This is not the place to debate ethical concerns that may arise from the inadvertent use of technological
products. However, it is important to stress that the ethically viable use of medical technologies would
undoubtedly require an adequate assessment and evaluation of functionality. Therefore, one might consider it
essential to stress the importance of reliable evidence in ethical considerations about technological use in
healthcare (Chalmers & Glasziou 2009).
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effective and safe, the technology has to be at least equally effective to any competing
technology with an established function for the same purpose in the same treatment
situation. Hence, an assessment of medical products for human use must prove their
relative effectiveness (Parvizi and Woods 2014), and the technology to be used should
be assigned a function for that health care purpose. The less effective technology will
either be abandoned or serve as a backup should the primary option fail.
Of course, it is often the case that two technologies can be used to perform the
same functional task. However, it is very rare to find two technologies performing
a medical function with the same level of effectiveness or efficacy. In all likeli-
hood, the efficacy by which functions are performed will vary within a range of
functional efficacy in which different technologies operate. This enables re-
searchers to determine the relative utility of technologies in accordance with their
functional performance on specific medical tasks. This is helpful, for example, in
deciding the relevant dose in a specific treatment context, by specifying the
dosage interval and duration of treatment.
Determining the ability of health technologies to perform for a particular health care
function requires sorting clinical functions according to their effectiveness and safety.
This is because a medical technology can be more or less (clinically) effective than
comparable alternative technologies intended for the same functional task. One might
consider, for instance, the kits routinely used in virology diagnostics. Several tech-
niques have been devised for detecting viruses, including the use of electron micros-
copy to detect viruses from clinical specimens (for example, to observe individual virus
particles), viral antigen detection, light microscopy (to visualize and map bacteria
infected by viruses), and many more. Additionally, viral tests can be used to monitor
the effectiveness of vaccination. Many of these kits have been commercially designed
to detect or identify the same bacterial pathogens and to diagnose the same viral
infections. In other cases, the same kit is easily modified to serve the purpose of
diagnosing different viral infections. For this reason, it becomes important to take into
account that the effectiveness and accuracy for detecting and identifying viruses can
vary significantly between individual kits or functions and that some tests are highly
effective, whereas others are moderately or almost completely ineffective.
A similar example can be made with synthesized substances. For example, evidence
suggests that aspirin administered daily in low doses helps to prevent stroke, whereas
the same drug in higher doses (several tablets per day) is no more effective in
preventing stroke, but entails an increased risk of stomach ulcers (Antithrombotic
Trialists’ (ATT) Collaboration 2009). A functional ascription has to take into account
the effectiveness of a particular pharmaceutical product in performing its intended
function, such as detecting pathogens or alleviating pain. Clinical studies of health care
interventions are designed and conducted to detect very modest incremental improve-
ments. Part of the reason is that the effects of substances designed for certain functions
are rarely obvious and easily detected (Glasziou, Chalmers, Rawlings, and McCulloch
2007). This makes it difficult to obtain market approval for new drugs without
evidential support from clinical trials (FDA 2005).
Based on the above considerations, a problem for the ICE theory of evidence is that
it is based on a misconstrued view of the evidential procedures in medicine that warrant
assigning functions to medical products relative to a use plan constructed by profes-
sional designers (e.g., drug manufacturers):
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BAn example would be the pharmacologists who constructed the new use plan for
Aspirin that has the goal of preventing blood clots in cardiac patients. These
researchers can ascribe to Aspirin the function to acetylate the enzyme cyclo-
oxygenase in thrombocytes relative to this use plan, because they believe that
Aspirin has this biochemical capacity (Bcap) and that this capacity contributes to
preventing blood clots (Bcon). Moreover, these researchers can explain their
effectiveness belief for the new use plan of Aspirin through an account A that
consists of scientific and (bio-)technological knowledge, and that explains their
beliefs Bcap and Bcon. Hence, this function ascription also satisfies our definition
of function ascriptions by designers and justifiers^ (Houkes et al. 2011, p. 99).
Houkes and Vermaas then go on to conclude on the same page: BFunction ascrip-
tions by professional designers, who construct new use plans for newly produced
artefacts on the basis of expert knowledge, satisfy this definition in an analogous
way: for an illustration, just replace the Aspirin in the last example with a hypothetical,
newly developed drug that has the same capacity and a similar use plan^ (p. 99).
Yet, describing how well an artifact is able to function is a methodological feat that
provides evidence of a different kind to that provided in, for example, the form of an
expert judgment. Chemical substances can be synthesized with the intention of achiev-
ing a desired pharmaceutical effect. How well the substance is able to perform the
claimed function is, however, arguably conditioned on its (1) level of effectiveness or
efficacy for a health care purpose, and (2) not harming the patient. It would be
extraordinary if the justification for such a purpose had bypassed clinical trials and
was instead derived from the presumed mechanism of action invoked in designing the
substance, or inferred from the manufacturers use plan.
How well a medical artifact functions is typically determined by evidence from
comparative clinical studies measuring the effects of its use in actual health care
settings. This type of information cannot be obtained through testimony reflecting the
estimates or beliefs of efficiency from experts or manufacturers, such as how he or she
designed the technology. Moreover, there is no systematic way of handling (e.g.,
synthesizing) information from expert testimony and physiochemical reasoning about
medical functions. In clinical research, a meta-analysis in a systematic review provides
a very useful technique to combine and analyze information from several high-quality
studies, and it is, therefore, likely to provide more definitive conclusions than the
individual studies alone (Mebius 2014).
So, the problem with ICE view of evidence, which is also related to the prominent
role it gives to mechanistic reasoning and testimony, is that it is unnecessarily restricted
in distinguishing relative performances of the same functions. For example, a viral test
with a success rate of 97 out of 100 cases will fulfill the same capacity (i.e., function) as
a test that identifies 1 out of 100. Notably, the theory of evidence employed by the ICE
theorist leaves the conditions under which technologies are sufficiently effective to
properly perform their designated function inadequately specified. The ICE theory of
evidence leaves undetermined the cutoff point for where an effective function lies and
the procedure for establishing the comparative efficiency of other medical technologies
developed for the same health care purpose. The ICE theory of evidence is, therefore,
not able to tackle the problem of comparing degrees of functioning (and safety) in
assessing health technologies.
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As suggested earlier, many regulatory bodies will only recognize evidence from
comparative clinical studies when approving medical technological products. For
example, in their guidelines for diagnostic evaluations, the European Medicines Agen-
cy (EMA) (an organization similar to the American Food and Drug Administration)
state their conditions for approval of diagnostic agents as follows:
BIn general, the approval of a diagnostic agent is usually based on clinical
indications rather than the general properties of a specific molecule… In all
cases, it is required to demonstrate adequate technical and diagnostic performance
of a new diagnostic agent in relation to a standard of truth and, when appropriate,
to an established comparator in the clinical context in which the diagnostic agent
is to be used in well-designed superiority or non-inferiority trials.^ (European
Medicines Agency Committee for Medical Products for Human Use (CHMP)
2009, p. 15-16)
In sum, to assign a function to a health technology, it is necessary to determine that
its medical function is more clinically effective than a comparable technology. A theory
of evidence for ascribing medical functions to technologies needs to recognize the
evidential role of clinical studies in medical research and practice. Evaluations of
benefit and harm, by properly controlled trials and other clinically relevant methods,
are necessary for establishing the comparative performance of health technologies for
specific treatment purposes.
6 Conclusion
The uncertainty accompanying technological use is a common theme in health care and
biotechnological innovation. This is why health care technologies are required to
demonstrate efficacy and safety to help ensure, as far as possible, that interventions
that are ineffective and harmful are not mistakenly adopted in medical practice.
Justifying the use of health technologies requires evidential warrants establishing (1)
that the technology works, (2) that it is applicable to the target condition, (3) that its use
is relatively safe, and (4) that it compares well with alternative interventions.
ICE function ascriptions do not prioritize information that is relevant to
patients, clinicians, and policymakers. Moreover, it has been shown that, consid-
ering the evidential basis relied on for their justification, ICE ascriptions do not
take into account the relative benefit and harm of medical technologies in
ensuring safe functional performance. Another aspect that is not addressed by
the theory is functionality, which pertains to the degree of function exhibited by
technologies. Finally, it has been suggested that the ICE theory does not take
into account possible effects of biases that make function ascriptions to medical
technologies unjustified.
I have argued from the perspective of clinical research and care that inferring
biotechnological functions from evidence such as testimony is unjustified.
Assigning functions to health care technologies requires demonstrating adequate
technological performance. More specifically, the performance of a technological
agent should be validated in the relevant clinical context intended for its use and,
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whenever possible, in relation to an established comparator. Decisions in the
field of health care technology need to be made with reliable evidence of
effectiveness, efficiency, and safety as a basis for accepting functional ascriptions
to medical technologies intended for human use.
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